Flexner Book Club Blog

2011 Mary Flexner Lecturer: Judith Butler

August 19, 2011
by Steph Herold
1 Comment

Butler vs. Reality, Round 2

Judith Butler totally saw me coming. In her preface to this week’s essay, Butler addresses my critique from two weeks ago that theory and reality are fundamentally disconnected. To explain to the reader that “there is someone here,”  behind the fancy words and the brilliant theories, she briefly documents her own activism within the LGBTQ movement and her struggle with gender identity.  I wish she had written entire books about this (perhaps she has?), critiquing that movement, and, by extension, all social justice movements, from the perspective of someone steeped in thinking about sex, power, and performativity. I wanted to hear more about her diagnosis of the LGBTQ movement as full of  “hopefulness and internal dissension.”

Instead of digressing into movement politics, Butler tackles my critique of her theory being too difficult to digest,  too far from reality,  by posing the following questions (all on p.97):

  • “Are those who are offended making a legitimate request for ‘plain speaking’ or does their complaint emerge from a consumer expectation of intellectual life?”
  • “Is there, perhaps, a value to be derived from such experiences of linguistic difficulty?”
  • “Who devises the protocols of ‘clarity’ and whose interests do they serve?”

These are not easy questions, so instead of trying to answer them, I’ll pose a few questions of my own: Who is Butler’s audience? Does she want her theory to stay inside the academy, or does she want it to cross the radar of a layperson? In her preface, she says, “it has been one of the most gratifying experiences for me that the text continues to move outside the academy to this day” (page 96). Where is this text being used outside the academy? Is it being used by gender deviant/gender non-conforming individuals to help their advocacy efforts?

Let’s step back for a moment. According to a study released in February of 2011 by the National Center for Transgender Equality, transgender and gender non-conforming Americans were:

  • Nearly four times more likely to live in extreme poverty, with household income of less than $10,000
  • Twice as likely to be unemployed compared to the population as a whole.
  • More likely to face a disproportionate amount of discrimination, especially if the trans individual is a person of color, in regards to housing, health care access, employment,  and harassment by law enforcement.

The list goes on and on (here’s the full report). Should we expect communities who are fighting for their very survival to get down in the weeds with Butler’s philosophical jargon? Do Butler’s theories matter to these communities? Or, thinking about it another way, is she bringing the concerns of the trans and gender non-conforming communities to light in academia, where they are seldom heard?

August 19, 2011
by Vanessa Christman
Comments Off on We’ve come a long way … still so far to go

We’ve come a long way … still so far to go

When you live in a house with two teenagers, it’s easy to believe that identity is performative. You don’t have to read Foucault to know that a brow piercing is some kind of inscription of the soul on the body. Over the last few years, I have seen a “fluidity of identities” in my household that bears out Butler’s idea about the importance of resignification and recontextualization (112). In this case, the contexts (adolescence, high school, dating) are some of the most brutal known to humankind; the norms, the most punishing. Still, somehow my children are emerging with what seems like a self-composed identity, or at least self-informed, and many of their peers seem to be similarly fortunate.

And yet, I know I cannot compare adolescence, as painful as it is, with living one’s life in the margins of gender and sexuality. I know that Butler’s call, in the Preface to the 1999 edition of Gender Trouble, for “the extension of. . . legitimacy to bodies that have been regarded as false, unreal, and unintelligible” (101) is still an urgent plea in 2011. We still have to imagine what the world would have to be like to make life possible for sexual and gender minorities (98). I think we are creating this new world little by little, with the increases in states recognizing and legalizing gay marriage, with talk shows featuring transgender people and discussions—and with women’s colleges, Bryn Mawr included, examining possibilities for inclusivity across the gender spectrum.

I have had the privilege of inheriting Butler’s theories; they inform my work and my worldview. And I must remember that, if we are making progress in “increasing the possibilities for a livable life” (103) for those outside a gender binary, it took Butler’s assertion that “genders can be neither true nor false” (111) and her debunking of any “true or abiding masculinity or femininity” (115) in Gender Trouble to bring us to this point. Her statements in Chapter 3 are powerful: by the end of the chapter, I emerged even more convinced of the hegemony of heterosexuality and the oppression of “masculinist domination” (115). Still, I felt the absence, alluded to in her Preface, of other factors. How do race and (non-Western) culture complicate her theories? And how do we address the complex intersections of identity?

August 19, 2011
by Sara Alcid
Comments Off on Butler and The Prettiest Boy

Butler and The Prettiest Boy

Earlier this week, I received New York Magazine in the mail and was surprised to see what I perceived at first glance to be a bare-chested woman on the cover.  It turns out that the model on the cover is male-bodied and featured in the “The Prettiest Boy in the World” article, which is about Andrej Pejic’s career as a model for both men’s and women’s high fashion clothing.  I was quickly reminded that the “construction of coherence,” regarding gender, “conceals the gender discontinuities that run rampant…” and that even being a Gender and Sexuality Studies minor and reading all the Judith Butler work you can get your hands on does not make you immune to subconscious compliance with gender coherence (110). Conveniently, reading Butler’s “Bodily Inscriptions, Performative Subversions” was helpful in looking back at how and why I assigned a gender to the model on the magazine cover and examining the magazine’s approach to covering the work of “the prettiest boy in the world.”

I would argue that gender is one of our most utilized “tools” in the navigation of society and culture.  Even those well aware of the way that the notion of gender operates as a constructed form of social discipline are prone to, probably due to a lifetime of socialization within the gender binary, evaluate those before them for a projected gender.  We use this “gender evaluation” to inform and organize our interactions with the world.  This is much of the reason that I subconsciously categorized the magazine cover model as “female,” based on the model’s body stylization and performance.  As Butler describes throughout Gender Trouble, gender is really a repetition of “…acts, gestures, and desire [that] produce the effect of an internal core or substance…” (110).  Thus, the interpretation of each others’ genders is a vehicle for gender performance to be equated with an “internal core or substance,” which refers to the “natural” connection that is often drawn between anatomical sex and gender.  Butler suggests that we are socialized to draw this connection between the act of gender and an inherent gender “core” because it effectively conceals the work of “political regulations and disciplinary practices” (111).

Pejic states, “I know people want me to sort of defend myself , to sit here and be like, ‘I’m a boy, but I wear makeup sometimes.’  But you know, to me, it doesn’t really matter.  I don’t really have that sort of strong gender identity—I identify as what I am…”  Throughout the remainder of the interview, Pejic remains gender-non-conforming, but the article’s author assigns male pronouns to Pejic.  The author, Alex Morris, seems to be writing about Pejic with an eye that is very much attached to the “illusion of an interior and organizing gender core” (110).  From Pejic’s anatomical sex, Morris manifests a gender identity.

Morris also wrote that Pejic and transsexual runway models are “sidestepping the gender issue altogether by not only passing as women but even managing to be a more ideal version of the impossibly hipless and curveless women the fashion industry fetishizes.”  This statement is most alarming to me for several reasons, but discussing that could be another few blog posts, so I will settle with looking back to my first post about gender deviance and if deviance can ever truly escape societally prescribed gender ideals.  In this article, we see Pejic, who does not conform to gender, being glorified for their ability to “pass” as a woman, with the added bonus of not having those awful hips and curves.  (I hope my sarcasm is obvious).  What do you think?

August 19, 2011
by Mary Zaborskis
Comments Off on “Don’t Be a Drag, Just Be a Queen [or a Grand Supreme]”-Lady Gaga

“Don’t Be a Drag, Just Be a Queen [or a Grand Supreme]”-Lady Gaga

I should probably be embarrassed to admit in a public forum that over the course of this summer,  I have become incredibly addicted to the fascinatingly disturbing TLC program Toddlers & Tiaras (sadly,  the season finale was last week, but (un)luckily,  I now have Lifetime’s Dance Moms to fill the void).

T&T has received intense criticism for its portrayal of the child pageant world,  a universe abound with flippers (fake teeth),  parents with an obscene amount of disposable income (children often compete in $2000+ dresses for significantly less cash prizes),  and little girls not yet potty trained rocking more eyeliner than a heavy metal band. The main critique of the show is its sexualization of young girls—in essence, that girls are being made into women before their time. Interestingly,  this critique operates within a heterosexual matrix—it doesn’t want to acknowledge children as sexual beings yet,  but it still acknowledges and assumes that they can and will become sexual beings,  and heterosexual beings at that,  when the culturally sanctioned time is right (for more on this notion that children-don’t-have-sexuality-unless-it’s-an-assumed-heterosexuality,  check out Kathryn Bond Stockton). The issue isn’t the gendered performance;  the issue is that the performance is out of time. Implicit in these critiques is that wearing make up,  dressing provocatively,  and sporting spray tans are all okay for the purposes of being attractive presumably for the purpose of attracting a member of the opposite sex—just not yet.

While I am certainly not defending the show (at least for the purposes of this entry) and acknowledge the aforementioned problem and a multitude of others with the child pageant world,  reading Judith Butler’s “Bodily Inscriptions,  Performative Subversions”  made me consider T&T in a new light. In this piece,  Butler points to drag as an example of subversion,  or that which “establish[es] that ‘[gender] reality’ is not as fixed as we generally presume it to be”  (101). Drag causes anxiety because it destabilizes the fictive and “falsely naturalized . . . unity”  (112) of “anatomical sex,  gender identity,  and gender performance”  (111). This destabilization “reveal[s] the performativity of gender”  (113),  threatening those naturalized categories which society needs to exist to continue to operate in a way that accepts and excludes certain bodies,  sexualities,  and genders.

I wonder if the anxieties over the children of T&T point to these glitzed-out girls as another example of subversion. That the gendered performance of a grown normative woman can be enacted by these girls in a way that stirs such controversy and scrutiny suggests that the “woman”  being performed by the girls is convincing enough to critics (or that critics think that the performances are convincing enough to viewers,  unspecified sexual predators,  etc). That this performance can be so easily co-opted by toddlers in a way that’s convincing enough to cause anxiety points to an unfixed-ness of the gender reality of,  in this case,  woman. Another dimension of the “unity”  of gender is its temporality—society wants gender to unfold according to a particular timeline,  and these girls illustrate that that timeline is also open to destabilization.

While Butler warns us that we have to be careful in deciding which parodies of gender are “effectively disruptive”  (113) of false realities and which merely “become domesticated and recirculated as instruments of cultural hegemony”  (113),  the controversies surrounding Toddlers & Tiaras indicate a deeper anxiety over gender norms as they’re linked with time. While there are arguably many reasons to be uncomfortable by the performances of these gendered princesses,  how much of that discomfort may have to do with the fact that these girls actually reveal some of gender’s illusory powers?

August 19, 2011
by Elly Truitt
Comments Off on The Performance of Gender in a Medieval Context

The Performance of Gender in a Medieval Context

Butler’s theory of the active performance of gender elicits questions related to my own research and teaching. I teach a course on medieval medicine and disease, and it seems that my students are perennially fascinated by the nuances of gender and embodiment present in medieval theories of sex difference. At one level, within the broadest framework of Aristotelian categories, all bodies were male. Women’s bodies were imperfect versions of male bodies, constitutionally too cold and damp to properly digest food (which then became transmuted into the humors via the stomach and liver) or extrude their genitals. Male bodies, characterized by a hot and dry complexion, had enough innate heat to digest food, and to extrude genitalia. Their innate heat meant that they could also get rid of noxious vapors that would otherwise build up within their bodies, causing illness. Body hair and regular secretions (mucous and semen, for example) were just two ways that male bodies naturally and perfectly purged themselves of toxins. Female bodies, on the other hand, had fewer options for releasing humoral excesses or putrid substances. They have less body hair, and only menstruate monthly (at best, keeping in mind that many women bore numerous children during their childbearing years, reducing their overall menstruation significantly).

Yet within this broad framework, a number of different theories of gender and/or sex arose and were debated to explain phenomena that did not fit into this broad Aristotelian framework. Many writers realized that complexion and sex difference existed along a spectrum that included viragos and effeminate men; that is, bodies that were physiologically, anatomically, and constitutionally “imperfect,” that did not conform to a strict Aristotelian or Galenic binary, and that resulted in gender that was performed wrongly, or at least in contradiction to established norms.

The one-sex body.

Several scholars of medieval and early modern bodies and sexuality have been influenced by Butler’s ideas, as well as Foucault’s (to whom Butler acknowledges her debt). The “one-sex body”is one such idea that has been examined in recent scholarship. This takes the Aristotelian idea to its extreme, that women’s bodies are imperfect inversions of male bodies.

However, it’s also been demonstrated that this idea, which did certainly exist in the early modern period, was limited to a particular time (several decades in the 16th and 17th centuries) and register (medical textbooks). While it’s certainly true that medieval gender was performed and constituted along specific norms, it’s also true that medieval notions of sex—and gender performance—were messier, more complicated, and less teleological than we might think.

Butler’s notion of the performance of gender was, as she eloquently states in the introduction to Gender Trouble, arose out of her own participation in different social movements and communities in which she lived for many years. “I went to many meetings, bars, and marches and saw many kinds of genders, understood myself to be at the crossroads of some of them, and encountered sexuality at several of its cultural edges.” (95) I wonder if medieval notions of gender would complicate or change her own ideas, or if they would confirm them.

 

August 4, 2011
by Elly Truitt
1 Comment

Uncanny Desire

While reading Butler’s complicated analysis of desire and the Subject in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, I was struck by its possible relationship to the Freudian concept of the Uncanny, and how desire makes and unmakes us.

Hegel’s work is an unstable coming-of-age story about the formation of the Subject; that is, how we become self-conscious, and Butler’s major contribution is to illuminate the importance of desire within that process of Hegelian self-making. The articulation of difference and desire are necessary to self-consciousness, as “self-identity is only rendered actual to the extent that it is mediated through that which is different.” The Subject creates herself through implicit or explicit comparison to an Other. Desire is productive and reflexive at the same time: It forces the Subject to consider herself in relation to something external, thus producing a “self” that the Subject can articulate and explain to herself. “This is me. That which I desire is not me.”

In this scheme, desire and difference are not just necessary to self-consciousness, they are also necessary to each other. The Subject must desire something extrinsic as a condition of self-discovery. While reading Butler’s careful exegesis of Hegelian desire, I was reminded of the concept of the Uncanny, or unheimlich (literally, in German, the “un-homely” but meaning deeply strange and unsettling), set out by early-twentieth century German psychologists Ernst Jentsch and Sigmund Freud. Jentsch first used the popular short stories of E. T. A. Hoffman to demonstrate his theory. Hoffman often included life-like dolls, strangely robotic people, and objects that switch between animate and inanimate in his stories (he’s the author of the short story that became the basis for The Nutcracker, which has toys and dolls that come to life and turn into humans).

According to Jentsch, focused on the life-like automata in Hoffman’s tales, especially “The Sandman,” the Uncanny is intellectual uncertainty that is primarily dependent on lack of familiarity (is a life-like doll a person or a doll?). Freud took this further, arguing that the Uncanny occurs when the Subject recognizes something—an automaton or a doppelganger—she is simultaneously attracted to and repulsed by. The attraction can be from a sense of familiarity (“That man looks just like someone my father used to know”) or Hegelian desire (“That girl Olympia is so pretty—she has such cool, perfect skin, and she dances perfectly. I wonder what she’d see in a red-faced, bad dancer like me?”). But the repulsion comes right behind (“The man my father used to know died years ago, so who is that man? Am I looking at a dead man?” “That pretty girl is so pretty and dances so well, and she is not human, or even a living creature, but I was still so attracted to her. Ew.”).

Freud says a lot more about the Uncanny, and how our response to it has a lot to do with social taboos and the terrifying desires of the Id, but what I’m most interested in is how revulsion or disgust complicate or enhance the role of desire in creating the Subject. Reading Freud, it seems like the disgust can stem from difference, even as, reading Butler and Hegel, that difference is crucial to distinguishing and creating ourselves. Does that mean that disgust and desire are the same … or similar?

August 4, 2011
by Vanessa Christman
2 Comments

The work of becoming a self

I’m reading “Desire, Rhetoric and Recognition” when the theme from the movie Laura comes on the radio. “Laura is the face in the misty light. . . .” While one part of my brain tarries on images from the film, I read, “We begin the Phenomenology with a sense that the main character has not yet arrived.” We are, Butler says, “‘waiting for the subject,’” who “will not arrive all at once” (51).

In Otto Preminger’s film, Laura is believed to be murdered, and while she has, therefore, “not yet arrived” when the action begins, the assembled characters gradually reveal information about her. Their descriptions are so compelling that the detective investigating the murder becomes fascinated with her. Later (spoiler alert), Laura appears—and the subject is now also the Other, an “explicit reality which has hitherto remained an implicit or nascent being. Before its actual appearance, the Other remains opaque, but not for that reason without reality” (74). Through Laura, I can more easily understand Hegel’s ideas.

My critical self scorns the idea that I should rely on popular culture to unlock philosophical concepts. But I discover that contemporary philosopher Slavoj Žižek uses exactly that approach. And when Butler references Saturday morning cartoons (52), I give myself license to freely associate as I read on. Kathryn Stockett’s bestseller The Help is on my mind as I read Butler’s explanation of the destructiveness of self-consciousness:

Now this same agency realizes that having negated the object, it still retains a dependency on that object; moreover, that determinate living object is not the same as Life itself, and so a potentially infinite number of living objects must be negated for self-consciousness to gain the monopoly on Life that it seeks, and this project soon appears endless and futile. (66)

I’m over-simplifying one of the book’s themes, but Stockett portrays a Mississippi in which whites would prefer to negate blacks, to annihilate them. However, for white women to maintain their elevated position, they cannot totally negate their fellow citizens—or who would serve them and raise their children? As Butler writes, “the death of the Other would deprive self-consciousness of the explicit recognition it requires” (78).

Reading on, I am reminded of Amy Winehouse. More than some people, artists “find [their] own identity through the Other” (78). For Winehouse, this powerful Other was fans, record companies, Grammy awards and tabloids. And it was addiction. When Butler writes of Hegel presenting the second appearance of destructive desire, that it “endeavors to overcome bodily life altogether” (78), I feel a profound sorrow. We know that “annihilation would undermine the project altogether by taking away life” (78), but we are helpless bystanders.

I find some comfort in the last pages of the reading, in which Butler guides us through Hegel’s discussion of self-consciousness, labor, and the material world. Winehouse’s “Love is a Losing Game” is now the song in my head. “[W]e are recognized,” Butler writes, “not merely for the form we inhabit in the world (our various embodiments), but for the forms we create of the world (our works)” (83). Pop culture or no, I celebrate the work that transcends the self.

August 4, 2011
by Sara Alcid
Comments Off on The Right of Recognition

The Right of Recognition

I will be the first to admit that “Desire, Rhetoric, and Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” left me confounded and frustrated.  I share Steph’s sentiments when it comes to this reading and often ask myself the same questions about feminist theory; is work that is inaccessible to most people divisive or helpful to the gender equality “movement”?  Feminist theory has always been greatly complimentary to my grassroots work and activism, but even more so, my grassroots work gives greater meaning to my study of feminist theory.  If I weren’t able to use theory as a sounding board and checkpoint for my work, in order to examine my experiences and beliefs from a renewed or completely different perspective, I would probably completely shy away from it.

I think that’s why I had such a hard time reading “Desire, Rhetoric, and Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.”  I struggled to connect the verbose text to my lived reality.  Judith Butler’s later work is relatively easy for me to dissect and relate to—it’s on a plane that I am familiar with, gender and queer studies—but I am far from comfortable with “the continental philosophers.”

Despite my intellectual discomfort and furrowed eyebrows throughout this reading, I noticed a possible relationship between desire/recognition and what Butler is currently working on; Butler describes that she will “consider further the gendered regulation of the field of appearances, i.e. who can be heard or seen, who can lay claim to rights of recognition and legal protection, and what forms the implicit limits of audibility and visibility within a particular public sphere” (http://news.brynmawr.edu/?p=8412).

In conjunction with the basis of Butler’s current work, I read desire and recognition in “Desire, Rhetoric, and Recognition in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” as primary elements to the process of social nascence.  “Striving to become coextensive with the world, an autonomous being that finds itself everywhere reflected in the world,” describes the experience of being recognized by the world through desire (76). 

With my Butlerian thinking cap on, I sensed connotations of social construction and systems of power in the process of “regulation of appearance” and the “right of recognition” in public spheres.  In other words, perhaps our journeys of “self discovery” are merely reflections and rearrangements of what is already before us.  Are we limited to recognition through preexisting projects of identity?  Is that why desire is almost insatiable, because its fulfillment is limited insofar as we are recognized by and can appear in structures of power?  Lastly, is that why middle school and high school were so tumultuous?  (Don’t worry, I’ll refrain from asking that at the Flexner lectures’ question and answer sessions).

August 4, 2011
by Mary Zaborskis
Comments Off on How Becoming of You

How Becoming of You

In typical Bryn Mawr English major nerd fashion, some friends and I share a favorite quote by Michel Foucault: “I don’t feel that it is necessary to know exactly what I am. The main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the beginning.” In moments of stress, realizations that those ten-year-plans we set freshman year might change, and mini-identity-crises (e. g. “I’ve been a vegetarian for five years but feel I must devour a steak right this second”), we like to remind each other that whatever is going on now is okay because, you know, we’re just “becom[ing]” who we are. (I know that you’re so wishing you could sit at my table in Haffner Dining Hall right now.)

While Foucault said this in 1982, Hegel theorized about “becoming” almost two centuries earlier, and Judith Butler expands on his work in “Desire, Rhetoric, and Recognition in Hegel.” In this piece, Butler again challenges us to reconsider another entity we usually consider stable: our very selves. While as subjects we might experience a “stable reality” (45), this “stab[ility]” disguises an “inherent movement in ‘being’” (49)—rather than being, we are always “becom[ing]” (49). Subjects are at once both destructive and generative—as the self “becomes,” what the self was is lost, but that self is now something new that it was not before.

It’s a notion that’s simultaneously calming and unnerving: “becoming” implies growth and change. Considering that I cringe whenever forced to remember a past version of myself, whether that be the me of ten years ago or ten hours ago, that who I am is always changing does make me produce an absurdly huge sigh of relief. The unnerving part is that it suggests the “I” experiencing the world around me isn’t fixed—and if “I” isn’t fixed but always “becoming,” is there any essence or constant to this “I?” Who am I, if anyone, anyway?

The impulse to pin down a fixed subject is certainly there, and Hegel claimed that we succeed (at least to ourselves) in fixing that subject by looking outside ourselves to know (or rather, learn of) ourselves. We are always in relation to the outside world, and others in that world are responsible for helping us make these literal self-discoveries and become these selves. To exist, we need an “Other who confirms us” (83).

While part of me wants to be resistant to this idea—a consequence of my Western upbringing that upholds the development of the individual as paramount, to be sure—it’s hard not to acknowledge all of the places where I’m guilty of trying to “know” myself by looking to something outside of me. Whether turning to friends, my horoscope, or one of Facebook’s many obviously-telling-and-totally-accurate personality quizzes, I often look to the outside to “confirm” or figure out who I am (or who I think I am, or who I want to be, or who I am not). There is almost a pleasure, even a relief, in the being told—I give information about myself and in return receive a coherent, stable, “figured out” identity.

Of course, it’s not just Facebook and friends who tell me who I am—these projects exist on larger scales. Those things that we think are most natural about ourselves are often actually results of what we’ve been told about who we are. While Hegel acknowledges that our consciousness mediates our interaction with the world and thus means that we help create the world, the world is also creating us. If we don’t have a say in that creation, then can we ever be sure we’re “becoming” who we want to be? How much control do we really have over these selves we grow into? What people and/or institutions are in charge of our “becoming?” How much possibility is there, then, in who we can become?

August 4, 2011
by Steph Herold
Comments Off on Butler vs. Reality

Butler vs. Reality

When I was a senior at Bryn Mawr, my sister was a freshman at Columbia University. I was jaded, ready to get out of academia, and even moved off campus and got a full-time job by the middle of my senior year. I was sick of theoretical discussions that had very little to do with the reality I lived and worked in—at the time, as a counselor at an abortion clinic. I wanted to stop arguing about literature and remain firmly in the real world, where I dealt every day with women who could barely afford a legal medical procedure.

Did my patients care about gender theory? For the most part, no. When you don’t even have money to feed your own children, you don’t spend your time analyzing Hegelian Spirit and desire.

My sister claimed her women and gender studies major and immediately challenged me. While I shrugged off theory (yes, including Judith Butler) as ivory tower pretentiousness totally divorced from reality, she embraced it, saying that my activism could be informed by theory, even deepened by it. We had heated debates about poverty, gender, and social justice, and slowly but surely she convinced me, a little bit anyway, that theory had some stock in making social justice more meaningful.

Reading this week’s Butler essay on Hegel took me right back to where I was before these discussions. I haven’t studied Hegel and found myself turning to Wikipedia and Google more than I’d like to admit. I became more and more frustrated with every sentence. I felt like my 21-year-old self, writing in the margins, “what?!” after a whole paragraph of what might as well have been written in hieroglyphics.

And then I called my sister. She talked me through my frustration and told me that sometimes it takes a professor, an expert, to help you make the connection from theory to reality. She also pointed out that this particular essay is part of Butler’s dissertation, written specifically for an academic audience familiar with the canon of German and French philosophers.

My question to my co-bloggers is this: Is there a way for us to read Butler outside the canon, in a way that meaningfully connects with our own non-academic lives?